The Folly of René Descartes’ Discourse on Method and Meditations on Fir

The Folly of Ren Descartes Discourse on Method and Meditations on First PhilosophyIn order to embark on his collect for truth, Descartes offset devises his four rules which should serve as a solid base of operations for all else that he comes to understand. Those rules are here evaluated in terms of what they proceed to take into consideration. The rules are examined individually and consecutively, and are therefore likewise reiterated in order to be clear about them. Furthermore, the shape up of using these rules is also analyzed to some degree. Ultimately, however, it is my conjecture that Descartes four rules are non as solid a foundation as he claims, but break to consider key issues which are noted herein.Descartes first rule deals with the imagination of truth, and states it as follows.The first rule was never to accept some(prenominal)thing as true that I did not plainly know to be such that is to say, carefully to forefend hasty judgment and prejudice and to in clude nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to call it in doubt. (11)In essence, we are to accept however what is true. This brings up the question of how one can even know truth. For Descartes, the certain(p) truth is I think, therefore I am, which is his first principle. However, even if this is a certain truth, how can we know anything else to be true? More importantly, however, the first rule states that nothing should be accepted that can be called into doubt, or to accept only that which is indubit fitting. Yet how can anything be indubitable, save perhaps Descartes first principle, and even there some may be able to find flaws? It go forms doubtful whether anything can be proven beyond any reas... ..., then there is no thing that is easier to know than another.Descartes use of this approach is a false foundation as he does not see these complications. The underlying frailty of such rul es is that it assumes absolute truths, without exceptions. I do not know of any truths that are absolute, and do not know of anyone who does. only more importantly, this approach would be much more effective if it was an inductive, and not a deductive, method. With an inductive method Descartes could not be refuted with a mavin instance, and he would not need to account for all contesting situations. It seems doubtful whether an suddenly deductive method could ever exist, based on the limits of human knowledge. workings CitedRen Descartes. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. 4th edition. Trans. Donald A. Cress. capital of Indiana Hackett, 1998.